Author: Sender Su

  • From Game Platforms Using CPU’s fTPM to Trace Cheating Players: Network Privacy and Network Security Cannot Coexist

    From Game Platforms Using CPU’s fTPM to Trace Cheating Players: Network Privacy and Network Security Cannot Coexist

    The author: Certified Information Systems Auditor, System Analyst (China Software Exam), Master of Software Engineering

    I recently came across a news article about a player who purchased a used CPU and found himself banned from a gaming platform. For every time he launched a game, he got kicked out. After contacting the platform’s customer support, he learned the CPU had been blacklisted because its previous owner was a cheater.

    In my view, this matter goes far beyond anti-cheat measures. It represents a form of physical-device-based identity tracking that directly undermines network privacy.

    1. The Present and The Past

    Here is the link to the news article. Interested readers can look into it themselves for more details:

    https://www.heise.de/en/news/Used-processor-leads-to-game-ban-11471562.html

    As the title suggests, what I’m most interested in is how the gaming platform leverages the CPU for identity tracking. Before diving in, it’s worth revisiting a piece of history. This is the Processor Serial Number (PSN) feature that Intel once embedded in the Pentium III CPU [1]. The news article also references this historical episode.

    At the time, Intel’s original intent was to enhance network security in e-commerce and other domains by providing a unique serial number in each CPU, thereby supporting an identity verification mechanism that tightly binds transaction parties to their transactional behavior. However, once this feature was released, it sparked enormous controversy: transactions became more secure, but privacy went to zero. Because this unique, unchangeable hardware ID was arguably the best method for tracking online users [2].

    In the end, this controversy led Intel to announce the removal of the PSN feature from its CPUs.

    Considering how sophisticated targeted mobile ad delivery has become today, if the PSN feature existed in modern mobile CPUs, ad brokers would be laughing all the way to the bank.

    So my first reaction to this news was: could the CPU mentioned in the article also have an undocumented PSN-like feature?

    1. How TPM Creates Conflict Between Privacy and Security

    Looking more closely at the news report, the author hypothesized—based on some statements released by the gaming platform—that the platform leveraged the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) functionality built into the CPU. Different CPU vendors name this technology differently; in the case covered by the news (AMD CPUs), it’s called fTPM (firmware-TPM), while on Intel CPUs it’s named PTT.

    I found similar explanations from other sources. For instance, ROG (Republic of Gamers), well-known among gaming enthusiasts, explicitly states that to combat cheating, players must enable Secure Boot and TPM 2.0 (including fTPM) in their computers [3].

    Therefore, I agree with the news author’s hypothesis: it is highly likely that this gaming platform software installed a kernel-mode driver on players’ computers, thereby leveraging the CPU’s TPM functionality to write a unique ID to fTPM and subsequently reading that ID to track and identify players.

    Technically speaking, this isn’t particularly complex.

    But when it comes to TPM, I have quite a bit to say.

    It should first be noted that TPM is indeed a foundational component of modern network security. Its core positioning is as a “trusted hardware root,” with functions including secure storage of encryption keys, measurement and verification of the boot chain integrity at system startup, binding user credentials for operating system login, and providing remote attestation and device identity verification.

    For example, Windows BitLocker disk encryption, Windows Hello and PIN login credentials, and even the currently popular PassKey login technology all to some extent rely on and utilize TPM.

    But TPM’s ability to deliver these security functions hinges on the unique identifiers stored within it, the most critical being the Endorsement Key (EK):

    The EK is a pair of asymmetric keys burned into the TPM at the factory. The private key cannot be exported, while the public key and its certificate are readable. The EK is globally unique, immutable by the user, and non-migratable.

    This means that as long as a TPM exists, the device’s identity identifier is already firmly established.

    And for TPM functionality embedded in a CPU… this is essentially another PSN.

    When anti-cheat drivers (running at kernel level), enterprise management agents, firmware components, or even malware have the ability to access the TPM interface, they can read this identity identifier and achieve persistent device tracking. Even if a user wipes all user data and reinstalls the operating system, the device can still be identified.

    Moreover, this is not some undocumented feature. TPM access mechanisms already have standardized interfaces and API wrappers; any kernel-level driver has the capability to access them. Therefore, the gaming platform’s use of TPM for user tracking doesn’t exploit any vulnerability or backdoor.

    So this news once again highlights: any product based on the design philosophy of “determining identity through hardware” will inevitably give rise to the conflict between network privacy and network security.

    Furthermore, this problem is fundamentally an inherent contradiction in system-level security identity mechanisms: network security emphasizes identity confirmation, while network privacy requires identity concealment.

    The former requires that devices, users, and communication channels can all be reliably identified and verified—otherwise encryption, authentication, and access control are impossible; the latter seeks to minimize persistent identifiers that could be correlated, avoiding the long-term assembly of behavior trails, device fingerprints, and usage patterns into profiles. These two share the same underlying identity mechanism at the technical level, yet pull in opposite directions in terms of values—the more security relies on stable hardware anchors, the more easily privacy is betrayed by those anchors.

    This is the essence of the TPM dilemma: it is both a shield against attacks and a window exposing identity—a classic case of being unable to have your cake and eat it too.

    And it must be mentioned that TPM itself is also prone to bugs. I have previously written about TPM vulnerabilities on my blog:

    “As with any software, the TPM 2.0 module library has been found to have two vulnerabilities, rated 7.8 and 5.5.”
    https://www.wavecn.com/content.php?id=357 (Only in Simplified Chinese)

    And just recently in August 2026, AMD confirmed two additional fTPM vulnerabilities numbered CVE-2026-6726 and CVE-2026-6727, rated 8.5 and 8.3 respectively—quite high [4]. While exploiting these two vulnerabilities requires local privileged user access and isn’t particularly easy, users should still promptly update their BIOS to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

    1. Something Should Be Done

    From the current network security landscape, enabling TPM does more good than harm. Although the contradiction is inherent, readers can still take some steps—for example, clearing TPM records after purchasing used computer devices. While this doesn’t guarantee complete protection against encountering situations like the buyer in the news report, from a perspective of balancing security and privacy, it’s something that should not be overlooked.

    Scenario 1: Clearing TPM in a Windows Environment

    1. First, check whether the device is currently using BitLocker. If the system drive has BitLocker encryption enabled, clearing TPM will inevitably trigger recovery mode, requiring a recovery key to unlock the disk—effectively rendering the TPM clearing meaningless.
    2. For computers with BitLocker already enabled, disable BitLocker first. The method is to right-click on the encrypted drive letter, select “Manage BitLocker,” and then in the appearing “BitLocker Drive Encryption” interface, select “Turn Off BitLocker” for all drives. The disabling process takes some time.
    3. Back up and record Windows login credentials, especially distinguishing between PIN login and password login. A PIN is not a password; after clearing TPM, PIN login may become invalid. Biometric methods such as fingerprint login will essentially no longer work.
    4. Press Win+R, type tpm.msc to open the TPM Management Console, click “Clear TPM” in the right-hand operations pane, and follow the prompts to restart.
    5. Restart and confirm the clearing. During restart, if the computer displays a prompt similar to “Press Y to reset fTPM / Press N to keep previous fTPM record,” select Y to confirm.
    6. After restarting and logging into Windows with a password, re-enable BitLocker and reconfigure login PIN, etc.

    Scenario 2: Clearing TPM in a BIOS Environment

    If the used device is in a bare-metal state or the system cannot boot into Windows, you can clear TPM directly in the BIOS/UEFI.

    1. At computer startup, press the specific key to enter BIOS/UEFI. Which key to press depends on the device’s manual—today it’s not just the Del key; F2, F10, or even ESC keys are possible.
    2. Locate the TPM-related options, which may be buried somewhat deeply and may have different naming conventions. Most commonly, they are located under menus named Security, Advanced, or Trusted Computing. Option names may include TPM 2.0 Security, AMD fTPM, AMD fTPM Configuration, Intel PTT, Intel Platform Trust Technology, Security Device Support, etc.
    3. Execute the TPM clear operation. After finding and entering the TPM management function, look for options such as Clear TPM, Reset TPM, or Clear Security Device on the operation interface, select and confirm Yes.
      Note: We are clearing the old state, not disabling TPM functionality, so TPM should be kept in the Enabled state.
    4. Save configuration and restart. Then, when reinstalling the operating system, configure BitLocker, PIN, and other features as needed.

    This process can help you clear the previous owner’s user state and data remnants. However, for devices that have already been blacklisted by gaming platforms via TPM identity, clearing TPM may not necessarily resolve the issue, because what was recorded might be based on the EK, which cannot be cleared.

    [1] Intel Processor Serial Number Q&A for OEMs

    https://www.theregister.com/off-prem/2000/05/04/intel-processor-serial-number-qa-for-oems/488918

    [2] Intel Case – Processor Serial Number (PSN)

    https://courses.ischool.berkeley.edu/i224/s99/GroupJ/presentation.pdf

    [3] Fix Game Launch Errors Update TPM2.0 in BIOS Utility

    https://rog-forum.asus.com/t5/technologies-explained/fix-game-launch-errors-update-tpm2-0-in-bios-utility/ba-p/1141117

    [4] AMD ID: AMD-SB-7064, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Reference Code Errata

    https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7064.html

    ~ End ~

  • Post-Conference Reflections: HKCS X HKIB Seminar on Quantum Resilient Finance

    Post-Conference Reflections: HKCS X HKIB Seminar on Quantum Resilient Finance

    Sender Su, founder of CrossWise Infotech Limited (the author), attended the seminar titled “Quantum Resilient Finance – Hong Kong’s Next Frontier” jointly organized by the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers (HKIB) and the Hong Kong Computer Society (HKCS) on 27 March 2026.

    Through this conference, the organizers deeply explored the transformative impact of quantum computing on the financial services industry, focusing on how it reshapes the cybersecurity landscape and emphasizing the importance of adopting Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to ensure the future digital resilience of the banking sector. Speakers and guests came from government departments, statutory technical bodies, higher education institutions, banks, and industry enterprises.

    According to the moderator, due to the critical nature of the topic, the total number of registrants exceeded 1,000. The author observed over 700 online participants, and combined with the offline attendance, the event was fully packed.

    The session began with a speech by an HKIB representative, who pointed out that the banking sector is particularly concerned about quantum computing because financial security is built upon modern cryptography—specifically, the “traditional” asymmetric encryption systems. Emerging financial areas, including Bitcoin, are also based on asymmetric encryption and message digest technologies. The purported rapid decryption capability of quantum computing poses a severe threat to the security foundation of the financial system.

    Subsequently, an HKCS representative used the recently high-profile OpenClaw incident as an entry point, stating that Q-Day (Note: The day when quantum computers develop sufficient computing power and stability to practically crack current mainstream public-key encryption systems. It is viewed as the “Doomsday Clock” for cybersecurity; once it arrives, existing digital trust infrastructures, including banking transactions, digital identities, and blockchains, will face collapse risks) is comparable to the Y2K problem but with more far-reaching and longer-lasting impacts. At the same time, the enactment and implementation of Hong Kong’s “Protection of Critical Infrastructure (Computer Systems) Ordinance” have also prompted the industry to pay further attention to cybersecurity and strengthen related responsibilities. Therefore, focusing on quantum computing is a key measure for advancing the implementation of cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure regulations.

    Following this, several speakers started with the basics of quantum computing, explaining the differences between quantum and classical computers, as well as concepts like Crypto Agility and Quantum Resilience, and sorted out the latest industry developments regarding PQC algorithms, standards, and compliance requirements.

    The ingenuity of quantum algorithms lies in their potential to solve specific problems more efficiently than classical algorithms, as the quantum superposition and entanglement properties they utilize cannot be effectively simulated on classical computers. In the field of cybersecurity, quantum computing has already demonstrated strong positive application potential, with secure transmission during key exchange processes being one of the most mature application scenarios currently.

    So-called post-quantum algorithms refer to algorithms specifically developed to resist the decryption capabilities of quantum computing. According to the author’s understanding, NIST has released three PQC standards (FIPS 203, FIPS 204, FIPS 205) and is advancing the standardization of subsequent algorithms, including FALCON (FIPS 206) and HQC (FIPS 207). Other countries and regions are also formulating related standards, mostly referencing and to a certain extent following these international frontier developments.

    In terms of specific applications, the most prominent area currently is the CA industry. Regarding the validity period of TLS/SSL certificate issuance, the industry is formulating a strategy of gradual shortening. According to the CA/B Forum announcement, the industry consensus goal is to shorten the validity period of newly issued certificates to only 47 days by 2029 to counter the potential cracking capabilities of quantum computers at that time. This strategy appears radical but is actually conservative, aiming to shorten the attacker’s time window (conversely increasing the time cost) to compensate for the vulnerability during the algorithm transition period, without destroying the existing certificate issuance and verification system.

    However, based on the author’s observation, if compatibility and security are to be balanced during the transition phase, the “Hybrid Mode”—running both traditional and PQC algorithms simultaneously in the system—is the inevitable transition solution. This situation is similar to the practice when the TLS/SSL certificate signature digest algorithm migrated from SHA-1 to SHA-256, where each signed program file carried certificates for both old and new algorithms.

    A more aggressive strategy is to rebuild quantum-resistant information technology infrastructure from scratch. For resource-rich organizations or governments, this strategy can be implemented for specific use cases. For example, the Singapore Blockchain Ecosystem, led by the Singapore government, plans to adopt PQC algorithms.

    However, generally speaking, quantum-resistant encryption algorithms are still in the research and development phase and are not yet fully mature.

    Conference speakers also pointed out that feasible measures exist in practice to achieve transparent upgrades of traditional encryption systems, such as deploying encryption proxy mechanisms at the connection point between the system and the network: i.e., traditional asymmetric encryption is used between the system and the proxy, while the proxy provides quantum-resistant encryption connections to the external internet. This bridging method is a common means for information systems to cope with the transition between old and new technologies.

    As a professional member of the HKCS with professional backgrounds including CISA, SA, and MSE, the author found the content of this conference quite familiar. Precisely because of this, the author was able to think from the perspective of HKIB attendees: as potential adopters of PQC, they inevitably face the difficulty of how to implement it. The core of implementation lies in fulfilling the most general requirement:

    Focus on implementing countermeasures early and in a timely manner.

    During the Q&A session, attendees raised similar questions, and guests shared their insights. In the author’s view, to concretely implement this, two questions must be clarified in the time dimension:

    Early: How much time in advance?

    Timely: What is the latest deadline?

    The author believes there is currently no standard answer. This largely depends on the progress of quantum computers and PQC algorithms and their interplay. Since adopters are not R&D personnel or product manufacturers, they cannot practice earlier than the progress of these two factors. Therefore, “early” requires observers to broaden information channels and continuously track industry developments: on one hand through various IT news and vendor releases, and on the other hand, more importantly, by paying attention to the latest research papers in the field. arXiv is an important tool, and its information is often more cutting-edge than releases from government agencies like nist.gov.

    Of course, NIST’s role as a PQC technology aggregator is not to be underestimated. For instance, the 6th PQC Standardization Conference held by NIST in 2025 has related PPTs available for download, which are beneficial to study. The first presentation, “NIST PQC Standardization Project,” reviewed the first batch of PQC standards and subsequent selection processes. Notably, the presentation mentioned SP 800-227 regarding Key Encapsulation Mechanisms, outlined the US government’s mandatory 2035 deadline for migration to PQC, and introduced the NIST IR 8547 transition guidelines and the NCCoE migration project.

    Reading through the conference agenda, one can also find a presentation titled “Learn about the New NIST SP 800-53 Control Overlays for Securing AI Systems Project,” reminding readers to pay attention to AI system security while focusing on PQC.

    In addition, as a “Super Connector” between mainland China and the world, it is a necessary measure for Hong Kong to reference various standards. Domestic commercial cryptography technology can follow the progress of units such as TC578 (National Technical Committee 578 on Quantum Computing and Metrology Standardization) and the Commercial Cryptography Standard Research Institute. It is worth noting that while Chinese national standards distinguish between mandatory and recommended standards, recommended standards should not be ignored; once incorporated into relevant laws and regulations, they become de facto mandatory standards and must be implemented.

    As for “timely,” it requires grasping the timetables of various compliance requirements, such as the aforementioned 2035 deadline required by the US government. However, according to the latest analysis published by the Google Blog on 25 March 2026, based on its continuous investment and progress in quantum computing and PQC, Google believes that the final timeline for migrating to PQC algorithms to counter quantum computing has been moved forward to 2029.

    Thus, regarding what is “timely,” one must maintain a concept of continuous follow-up and dynamic updating.

    If observed from the perspective of gradual adaptation, the most suitable reference is the timetable for the adjustment of TLS/SSL certificate validity periods in the CA industry. As adopters, one should not only adjust internal certificate policies accordingly but also use this as a guide to reasonably arrange budgets, procure mature PQC systems or equipment in a timely manner, update traditional encrypted information systems, and guide the development and construction of new systems.

    For the Hong Kong industry, although the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has not yet released a specific mandatory roadmap for PQC, continuously tracking compliance requirements promulgated by the government and industry and maintaining technological “Agility” will be the best strategy to cope with future uncertainties.

    References:

    https://arxiv.org

    https://quantumalgorithmzoo.org

    https://csrc.nist.gov/events/2025/6th-pqc-standardization-conference

    https://www.nccoe.nist.gov

    http://www.tc578.com.cn/

    https://niccs.org.cn

    https://www.imda.gov.sg/how-we-can-help/blockchain-innovation/singapore-blockchain-ecosystem

    https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/safety-security/cryptography-migration-timeline

  • Evaluating OWASP Top 10 2025 A06: Insecure Design and the Irreplaceability of Cross-Domain Security Talent — A Perspective from Software Engineering and Cybersecurity, with Real-World Examples

    Evaluating OWASP Top 10 2025 A06: Insecure Design and the Irreplaceability of Cross-Domain Security Talent — A Perspective from Software Engineering and Cybersecurity, with Real-World Examples

    This article was originally published on the personal blog of the founder of CrossWise InfoTech and is republished here with edits.

    I. Introduction

    OWASP Top 10 2025 Risk #6 — “Insecure Design” — represents a true intersection between software engineering and cybersecurity, yet it remains the most common “gray area” where both sides tend to deflect responsibility or selectively ignore the issue.

    Cybersecurity practitioners often label it as “a developer’s problem,” arguing that surgical, tactical security measures are largely ineffective against design flaws deeply embedded in business logic. Conversely, software engineers habitually respond: “If the design is flawed, it’s because the business demanded it—it’s not a vulnerability.” The unspoken message? Business comes first; security can wait.

    This cognitive disconnect—and the failure of both sides to grasp the root cause—is why A06 persists.

    Insecure Design is not merely a coding defect. It is a structural risk seeded as early as the requirements analysis phase. The crux lies in whether the systems analyst conducting requirements elicitation possesses sufficient risk-awareness and the ability to infer threat vectors from business logic—only then can design and implementation teams respond cohesively.

    II. Typical Scenarios Leading to Insecure Design

    I present two real-world cases encountered personally:

    1) Experience-Based Inertia

    In Industrial IoT (IIoT), a common design inertia stems from the assumption that devices reside in physically isolated internal networks. Developers thus transmit control commands (e.g., start/stop, parameter adjustments) in plaintext over the network. While risky even in closed environments, the limited attack surface renders it a “manageable risk.”

    However, when this same logic is directly ported to consumer-facing, internet-connected IoT systems, uncontrolled risks emerge. Attackers can enumerate API endpoints, replay requests, or tamper with parameters to bypass authentication and directly manipulate devices.

    For example, consider this device API:

    POST /api/v1/device/12345/control
    Body: { "action": "set_max_op_mins", "value": 30 }

    If the API lacks proper access controls on the device ID (12345)—such as verifying user identity, permissions, or requiring a valid access token (clearly absent here)—attackers may brute-force device IDs, reconstruct valid payloads, and remotely control devices, causing physical damage and financial loss.

    Critically, if no authorization model was ever designed, this isn’t “broken access control”—it’s Insecure Design by omission. Code audits can confirm this distinction.

    The root cause isn’t poor coding skill, but design inertia: the failure to treat “resource ownership” and “operation authorization” as core business rules during system modeling.

    2) Risk-Embedded Business Models

    Beyond violations of explicit security principles, Insecure Design also manifests more subtly:

    When the business logic model itself constitutes a risk.

    Such issues are hard to detect but must be identified proactively during analysis—not deferred to design, implementation, or post-deployment discovery, where remediation may be catastrophic.

    Take an O2O online booking flow:

    users proceed through steps like selecting a store → service type → parameters → time slot → payment method → payment initiation → post-payment processing. Each step triggers at least one API call.

    From a pure business view, these steps seem necessary to guide users smoothly through the journey. Aligning APIs with this flow appears “logical.”

    But from a risk perspective, this design multiplies the attack surface by N, where N equals the number of APIs. A single vulnerable endpoint compromises the entire system.

    III. Solutions from a Software Engineering Perspective

    Both examples demand architectural and process-level fixes—no “surgical” security tool can compensate.

    For Case 1: Obfuscate sensitive parameters and implement robust authentication/authorization.

    Critics may ask: “Does obfuscation justify added complexity?”

    Yes—and crucially, obfuscation is just one means to achieve Confidentiality (C). The CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) must be balanced:

    • Integrity: Sign API payloads with digital signatures, or apply HMAC to critical IDs to prevent tampering.
    • Availability: Avoid over-engineering. A 10-minute-valid signature doesn’t require long keys or multi-algorithm validation.

    Patterns like JWT or external-to-internal ID mapping are viable—but selection must follow a holistic CIA assessment.

    For Case 2: Replace step-by-step APIs with a single “fetch service configuration” endpoint. Let the frontend handle all user interactions, and submit the complete order only at payment initiation, with full backend validation.

    This approach requires software engineers to deeply understand business logic during analysis, avoid rigid adherence to legacy workflows, and recognize that decoupling frontend logic from backend APIs enhances both flexibility and robustness.

    Ultimately, the cost of secure design cannot be judged by short-term ROI. Like database transactions or audit logging, security is not optional—it’s a core quality attribute. As analysts or architects, we must treat security as a non-functional requirement from day one and quantify its impact on reliability and compliance.

    IV. Reinterpreting Insecure Design from a Cybersecurity Lens

    Many security professionals still equate Insecure Design with “Broken Access Control”—a misconception.

    The essence of Insecure Design is the absence of mechanisms to constrain risk generation.

    Broken Access Control assumes a permission model exists; Insecure Design is far broader. Even analyzing resource ownership or role-action mappings captures only surface-level risks. True understanding requires a systemic view of risk exposure, as illustrated in Case 2: multiplying APIs exponentially increases systemic fragility.

    This blind spot stems from the chasm between security and business. As I’ve argued before:

    Security, if not integrated into business, will be marginalized—or ignored entirely.

    For executives: Should CIO and CISO remain separate roles? My answer is no.

    For practitioners: If your security reviews don’t engage with business-aligned artifacts—system design docs, data flow diagrams, permission models, and functional workflows—you’re not truly integrated.

    V. There Are No Shortcuts in Secure Design

    The most dangerous mindset in software development is:

    “Get it working first; add security later.”

    This “agile procrastination” is fatal for Insecure Design. Once data models, APIs, and permission schemes solidify, changes become exponentially costly.

    This also impacts economic auditing (a domain I specialize in):

    An application patched post-breach does not gain value from security investments—on the contrary, such spending confirms material defects, warranting asset impairment.

    In IP valuation or M&A contexts, this can nullify value entirely. Who would buy a system that required massive post-hoc security fixes? How can buyers trust no other critical flaws remain?

    Thus, Secure by Design means:

    Security is not a feature—it’s a foundational system capability.

    It demands that risk awareness permeate our very first UML diagram and use case.

    Systems analysts are the first line of defense for cybersecurity.

    VI. Where Do Cybersecurity Professionals Go From Here?

    Though rooted in my background (IS auditor + systems analyst + software engineering MSc), this discussion holds vital lessons for pure-play security practitioners:

    Future-proof security talent must stand at the intersection of software engineering and cybersecurity.

    The era of “Burp Suite warriors” brute-forcing APIs is ending—AI will automate repetitive tasks. Organizations now need bridge-builders: professionals who can read architecture diagrams, contribute to requirements reviews, and operationalize threat modeling. In short: those who can judge whether a design introduces unacceptable risk.

    Because today, security is inseparable from modern software engineering.

  • CrossWise Founder Joins Cybersecurity Technology Symposium 2025: Spotlight on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Executive Leadership in Cyber Governance

    CrossWise Founder Joins Cybersecurity Technology Symposium 2025: Spotlight on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Executive Leadership in Cyber Governance

    On January 20, 2026, Sender Su, Founder of CrossWise InfoTech Limited (“CrossWise”), participated in the Cybersecurity Symposium 2025, organized by the Digital Policy Office of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government.

    This third edition of the symposium demonstrated significantly enhanced professionalism and depth compared to previous years. The featured presentations and panel discussions covered numerous cutting-edge cybersecurity terminologies and the latest industry developments, substantially increasing the event’s value for attendees. Further details about the symposium can be found at:

    https://www.cybersechub.hk/tc/eventDetail/cybersecurity-symposium-2025

    The primary focus of this year’s symposium was undoubtedly the implementation of Hong Kong’s Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Computer Systems) Ordinance. To facilitate its smooth enforcement, the Office of the Commissioner of Critical Infrastructure (Computer-system Security) (OCCICS) has specifically drafted a Code of Practice for reference and compliance by relevant stakeholders. The Code is available at:

    https://www.occics.gov.hk/tc/industry/code-of-practice/index.html

    The sessions addressed current cybersecurity hot topics, including countering nation-state hackers in supply chain attacks, the critical role of executive leadership in cybersecurity practices, effective threat intelligence gathering, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by both attackers and defenders, the tactics and activity trends of ransomware groups, post-quantum cryptography applications, IoT security, personal data privacy protection, and digital asset safeguarding.

    Mr. Su is well-versed in all these areas. In particular, supply chain security, IoT security, and personal data privacy protection align precisely with the key objectives CrossWise successfully achieved for its clients throughout 2025. The company delivered an integrated suite of services—including penetration testing, risk assessments, source code audits, security remediation, and even business logic re-engineering—to comprehensively address these challenges.

    However, the topic that resonated most deeply with Mr. Su was the role of senior leadership in cybersecurity practice. This is indeed a familiar refrain: as far back as two decades ago, during discussions on enterprise informatization, executive buy-in was already recognized as pivotal. Today, as the focus shifts to cybersecurity, it simply reflects a formerly peripheral aspect of enterprise IT governance moving center stage. Fundamentally, the core challenge remains unchanged across time: it always comes down to people.

    It always comes down to people.

    Leveraging its extensive hands-on experience, CrossWise possesses a deep understanding of the perspectives and competing interests of personnel across different organizational levels and roles. This enables the company to design practical, actionable project solutions that effectively help clients integrate cybersecurity initiatives with software engineering projects, thereby mitigating risks at their source.

  • A Glimpse into the 2025 Hong Kong Cybersecurity Summit

    A Glimpse into the 2025 Hong Kong Cybersecurity Summit

    This year’s Hong Kong Cybersecurity Summit was postponed to November due to a typhoon. Coincidentally, Sender Su, Founder of Langji Tech, had just wrapped up a major phase of work and was able to attend this industry gathering.

    The summit’s theme—“Future-Proofing Digital Infrastructure: Harnessing AI for Enhanced Security and Resilience”—reflected the growing centrality of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity. While last year’s event featured distinguished academicians as keynote speakers, this year’s program placed even greater emphasis on practical AI applications. With AI now deeply embedded in both offensive and defensive cyber operations, discussions naturally revolved around its evolving role and implications.

    Speakers explored how AI is being deployed in cyber offense and defense, as well as the security measures needed to protect AI systems themselves—particularly large language models (LLMs). Data security surrounding LLMs emerged as a recurring focal point, aligning closely with Langji Tech’s forward-looking strategy. In fact, our team began strengthening cybersecurity frameworks for enterprise LLM adoption well before these concerns gained mainstream attention.

    Beyond AI, the summit also addressed significant shifts across the broader security landscape—from infrastructure design to regulatory compliance.

    Globally, for instance, SSL/TLS certificate lifespans are being progressively shortened. According to the CA/Browser Forum’s approved roadmap, starting March 15, 2029, all newly issued SSL/TLS certificates will have a maximum validity period of 47 days. While this enhances overall security, it introduces new operational risks—most notably, a higher likelihood of accidental certificate expiration due to more frequent renewal cycles. Meanwhile, the integration of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms into digital certificates is also gaining momentum, with gradual adoption expected in the coming years.

    On the local front, Hong Kong’s first Cybersecurity Law—the “Security of Critical Infrastructure (Computer Systems) Ordinance”—will take effect on January 1, 2026. This legislation will impose clear compliance obligations on responsible personnel within critical sectors. Compounding the pressure, threat actors are increasingly leveraging AI to conduct sophisticated intrusion, data theft, and ransomware campaigns. As in last year’s summit, many attendees were seen snapping photos of presentation slides during threat landscape briefings—a telling sign of the mounting anxiety in the room.

    Full text of the ordinance (in English):
    https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr2025/english/ord/2025ord004-e.pdf

    Among exhibitors, one mainland-based headline sponsor stood out for its strong localization efforts—particularly in building a capable local team well-integrated into the Hong Kong market.

    As a final note—and a uniquely Hong Kong touch—the summit doubled as a civic engagement platform ahead of the upcoming Legislative Council elections. Campaign flyers were distributed throughout the venue, and nearly every government-affiliated speaker concluded their talk with an earnest call for attendees to vote. CrossWise InfoTech joins in this spirit of civic participation and encourages everyone to cast your ballot on December 7!

    References:
    CA/Browser Forum 官網:
    https://cabforum.org/

    Ballot SC081v3:Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods
    https://cabforum.org/2025/04/11/ballot-sc081v3-introduce-schedule-of-reducing-validity-and-data-reuse-periods/